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Psychological Reflections on Mahatma Gandhi and the Future of 
Satyagraha 
 
Charles B. Strozier 




The article examines the life and work of Mahatma Gandhi from a psychological perspective. 
Special attention is given to the psychoanalytic study of Gandhi by Erik Erikson, Gandhi’s Truth, 
in 1969. The author notes his personal connection with Erikson’s book, which profoundly 
influenced his thinking (and life). The article alternates between a close psychological reading of 
Erikson’s book and Gandhi’s My Experiments with Truth. The larger point of the article is to reflect 
on the future of satyagraha or nonviolence. Gandhi’s own meanings of satyagraha are often 
difficult for many to accept, given the psychological violence that infected his form of 
nonviolence. His flaws, which must be reluctantly acknowledged, challenge us to formulate our 
own meanings of nonviolence (given our own flaws), since some form of satyagraha may be the 
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The second day of October 2019 marked the 150th anniversary of the birth of Gandhi. 
Celebrations around the world honored this remarkable and charismatic leader who charted a path 
of nonviolence that may be our only hope for survival. It is, however, easy to get lost in the fog of 
idealization that surrounds Gandhi. Doing so makes it hard to see the man underneath and consider 
the relevance of his form of nonviolence for others steeped in very different religious and political 
traditions, as well as personal values. Gandhi was a complex man full of contradictions, which he 
sometimes imposed on those he loved. His form of satyagraha required commitments that may not 
be relevant for others, though the principle that there is a politics of nonviolence we must articulate 
remains an immutable tenet of his legacy. He sacralized a political revolution of enduring 
relevance; to hold onto that in a time of apocalyptic threats to existence challenges all of us. At the 
same time, his unique experiences and, yes, flaws, complicate our own efforts to adapt satyagraha 
to a different time and place. I firmly believe a nuanced look at Gandhi from a psychoanalytic 
perspective deepens our capacity to imagine the difficult task of peacemaking in a violent world. 
Gandhi would probably not have welcomed my inquiry, though, thankfully, he was his own 
psychoanalyst. No one more relentlessly examined his own weaknesses and failings in what he 
calls in his autobiography his “experiments” with truth, his struggles with sexual abstinence, his 
troubled relationship with his children, his inability to corral his wife, Putali Ba, and whether it 
was right to embark on fasts as part of his politics.1 What always saves Gandhi is his humor. He 
was, he joked, in the saint business, which is a trying occupation. 
I came to Gandhi as channeled by Erik Erikson, and it is mostly Erikson’s psychobiography 
of Gandhi that I want to discuss, though I will add my own reflections on the future of satyagraha.2 
I run a monthly seminar at The City University of New York titled “Violence and Peacemaking” 
with some distinguished psychoanalysts and other intellectuals that is into its fourth year. One of 
our concerns has been how nonviolence can work and what is the psychology of peacemaking. If 
that is my contemporary experience, my personal journey with Gandhi and Erikson has been long 
in the making. My first job as an academic in 1972 came because a student had read the newly 
published Gandhi’s Truth in the late 1960s and miraculously convinced the history department at 
what became my college that no department of history could claim to be self-respecting unless it 
had someone versed in history and psychoanalysis. I may have killed the goose that lay the golden 
egg, because that was the first, and the last, time that such a position existed at an American 
university. But Erikson was already my hero long before that. As a senior at Harvard in 1965, I 
took his course on the human life cycle. On the recommended reading list was his 1958 book 
Young Man Luther.3 I read it, was transfixed, and said to myself, “That is what I want to do with 
my life.” And I have. 
Erikson’s book on Gandhi also transformed me personally. I was a 1960s radical and felt 
passionately that the Vietnam War was a moral blot on the United States. I spent many weekends 
in graduate school at the University of Chicago at one demonstration or another, was one of the 
student leaders when we took over the administration building in the university where my then-
deceased father, a French professor and dean, had worked, was tear-gassed in Grant Park more 
than once, and placed flowers in the rifles of the National Guard in front of the Hilton hotel during 
the raucous Democratic Convention of 1968. But until I read Erikson’s Gandhi’s Truth I didn’t 
understand the importance of self-purification in a campaign of nonviolence. Gandhi persuaded 
me to stop eating meat, which I followed for some thirty years, until I fell off the wagon a couple 
of decades ago. I discovered in the process, however, as he did, that defining vegetarianism is not 
straightforward. What is meat? Is it only beef, or does it include fish? Do you not eat animal 
products like milk? And most of all, What is the point of the project? For Gandhi, vegetarianism 
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was tied to his religion and especially his vow to his mother, Kasturba, not to eat meat. On that she 
was adamant. I don’t share Gandhi’s particular religious concerns, which made explaining to 
myself what I was doing especially complicated. Eventually, I came to agree with the philosopher 
Peter Singer that the point is not to kill in order to eat, which for many, especially younger people, 
has an added significance in an age of the twin apocalyptic dangers of nuclear destruction and 
global warming that hang over us.4 In my more recent reflections on my failed experiment with 
vegetarianism, I have returned to Gandhi’s implicit idea of self-purification as part of a nonviolent 
struggle. What that means in practice will vary according to personal taste, cultural and political 
norms, and one’s spiritual inclinations. For make no mistake about it: Satyagraha, as the religious 
scholar James W. Jones has pointed out recently, is a spiritual practice.5 
It is worth asking what one means by a spiritual practice. The standard and most obvious 
definition would be a way of carrying out the practices of one’s faith. For a Christian, that would 
require loving one’s neighbors as oneself; for a Jew, it might entail an additional involvement in 
bringing the dictates of the Torah into one’s daily life (such as keeping kosher); and for a Hindu, 
it would mean adopting a practice such as vegetarianism. But a spiritual practice extends beyond 
faith, though the two can be closely linked. The civil rights struggle in the United States was led 
by a Black Baptist minister who surrounded himself with others from around the country in a 
movement originally centered in the Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta that now abuts the Martin 
Luther King Jr. National Historical Park. In the civil rights movement, there was singing and 
praying before political actions and then more singing and praying that culminated in singing and 
praying. This specifically Christian form of spiritual practice, however, developed an increasingly 
ecumenical character as it drew in many without any Christian beliefs, including those from other 
faiths, especially Jewish leaders such as Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel and many others, and an 
often-disparate crowd of idealistic but secular, even atheistic, young people. The Christian hymns 
never stopped, nor did King’s lofty rhetoric calling forth images from the Book of Revelation, but 
the singing soon merged with the surging new folk music sweeping the land. Pete Seeger leading 
thousands in “We Shall Overcome” extended the more church-based singing of “Beulah Land.” 
Inspired music itself became part of the spiritual practice of the civil rights movement. What 
everyone found under the inspired leadership of Martin Luther King Jr. was a form of spirituality 
that sustained the risks involved in nonviolently facing angry whites throwing bricks, growling 
German shepherds biting at their legs, and fire hoses turned on them. 
Gandhi’s particular form of self-purification, as he developed his charisma in leading a 
revitalization of the Indian masses, included both vegetarianism and sexual abstinence. Those twin 
commitments, he felt, defined his required path to effective moral and political leadership. 
Vegetarianism was easy morally, but sex for him was tainted. As was not unusual in his culture at 
the time, his father, Kaba Gandhi, arranged Mohan’s marriage to Putali Ba when he was thirteen. 
There were ominous signs from the outset. The father rushed a trip to make the elaborate wedding 
ceremony and his coach overturned on a jagged road, seriously wounding him. He managed to 
hide how badly he was hurt during the ceremony, but his wounds worsened in time and he would 
die from complications related to them three years later. The young Gandhi paid scant attention to 
his father at the wedding ceremony and soon threw himself enthusiastically into sex with his young 
wife. He thought of her all the time and seemed to have sex with her daily (though there were 
extended periods of separation). He became furiously jealous and would not let her go anywhere 
without his permission. Later, he recognized how he constrained her life and how in the process 
of satisfying his passions he neglected his goal of teaching her to read, which left him feeling guilty 
for the rest of his life. 
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But more important, Gandhi’s “carnal lust,” as he called it, for his wife distracted him from 
caring adequately for his dying and ambivalently loved father. He was sixteen. In one room, he 
regularly nursed his father, changed the dressings, and did all he could to relieve his suffering from 
his infected leg. But even as he nursed his father, Gandhi thought of sex. On the evening his father 
died, Gandhi had left him to go wake up Putali Ba and have sex with her. She was pregnant at the 
time and later miscarried.  
Sex and death became inextricably intertwined in Gandhi’s mind. If he had been there with 
his father, Kaba Gandhi might have survived. Instead, Mohan was lost in the enjoyment of sex 
with his wife at the actual moment of his father’s death. At some level, it seems, Gandhi felt his 
lust had killed his father and, it is worth noting, his unborn child. In the often-contradictory way 
these things work, Gandhi came in time to blame his father for the trauma he suffered. The father 
should never have married him off at thirteen. Child marriage was a “cruel custom” in India, he 
says, but still something his father should have had the sense not to inflict on him. The father, 
furthermore, had his own issues with sex, as he was “given to carnal pleasures,” Gandhi says on 
the very first page of his autobiography. Kaba Gandhi’s first two wives died, but his third wife 
was still alive, just put away as a hopeless invalid, before he married Gandhi’s mother, his fourth 
wife. The oversexed father, in other words, as Gandhi imagined him in his unconscious, cast an 
intergenerational curse on him. Erikson concludes more generally that a man must “give an 
account of his conflicts with his father” in order to “make sexuality amenable to mastery.”6 
Gandhi found it extremely difficult to achieve that mastery. He found sticking to the vow of 
abstinence, or brahmacharya, nearly impossible. Only after he had four children and was thirty-
seven years old was he able to commit himself successfully to brahmacharya and feel pure enough 
spiritually to carry out his political campaigns. We are the beneficiaries of his remarkable journey 
and his particular path of self-purification that led in time to a fully developed theory of satyagraha. 
The tainted issues of his desire, however, suffered. 
That brings us to the story of Mehtab, Gandhi’s Muslim adolescent friend who sorely tested 
his vows of vegetarianism and fidelity. Gandhi honors the story of Mehtab in two chapters of his 
autobiography, one titled “A Tragedy” and the other “A Tragedy (Continued).” Mehtab repeatedly 
urged Gandhi to eat meat. It was the only way to be strong, he said, like the English. After being 
badgered, Gandhi finally agreed to try some goat meat. He hated it and that night had a horrible 
nightmare that a live goat was bleating inside of him (My Experiments, 19). Mehtab gave up on 
that project but soon turned to what he considered Gandhi’s weakness for his faithfulness to his 
wife. He insisted they visit prostitutes. Gandhi again protested but eventually gave in. He was a 
coward, he says. He was “saved” only by his inability to get an erection in what he called this “den 
of vice” (My Experiments, 20–21). The woman lost her patience at his impotence and threw him 
out of the brothel shouting “abuses and insults.” What is not entirely clear from Gandhi’s account, 
however, is whether subsequent visits were more successful. He says there were “four more similar 
incidents” though in “most” of them he was “saved by good fortune.” What happened when fortune 
failed to intervene? 
Gandhi’s wife, mother, and larger family all hated Mehtab, yet Gandhi resolutely stuck by 
what Erikson calls this embodiment of his negative identity (136–140). “By choosing Mehtab as a 
friend,” Erikson says, “he unconsciously tested himself in order to prove to himself that he could 
sin—and test the limits of that experience, too.” Erikson even wonders whether we shouldn’t erect 
a statue somewhere to Mehtab, for a great man must first engage, even embrace, his negative 
identity before he can find it in himself to discard it. That process, however, can pose great 
challenges for those intimately caught up in the negativity. Consider Harilal, Gandhi’s oldest son, 
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who grew up with Mehtab on the margins of the family, as his father became a charismatic icon 
and an impossibly virtuous man. How does a son find anything to correct or complete in a father 
of such unrelenting goodness and often self-righteous moralizing? “[There was] nothing [for 
Harilal] to live out [in Gandhi’s life],” Erikson says, “that remained recognizably unlived as a 
mourned and abandoned potential—except the old man’s negative identity, his ‘murdered self.’” 
Harilal was able to find a usable identity in Mehtab, and only in Mehtab. It was a sad choice, 
however, for Harilal became a Muslim, like Mehtab, but also a derelict and a year after Gandhi’s 
death was found in a coma in an unknown locality (which meant an improper burial). 
Erikson divides his book into two parts, The Past and The Event. The Past describes young 
Gandhi, his childhood, his experiences in England studying law, and his formative years in South 
Africa. The Event then describes Gandhi’s campaign of Satyagraha in Ahmedabad that involved 
for the first time his use of a fast as part of the political campaign. Erikson argues that the 
Ahmedabad strike defined the new directions of his ideas about the politics of nonviolence and 
established his identity as the leader of the national movement of revitalization that aimed to break 
the bondage with Great Britain. But halfway through his book, Erikson stops his own narrative 
and writes the Mahatma a twenty-five-page letter (229–254). The letter is a pained but exquisitely 
powerful cry of despair over what he argues is a form of violence imbedded in Gandhi’s developing 
sense of satyagraha. The letter itself has a context, because Erikson read it in draft form in the 
living room of Robert Jay Lifton’s Wellfleet home in Cape Cod in August 1967.7 Lifton had 
recently begun his annual psychohistory meetings that were to last then for fifty years. (I attended 
forty years of these meetings, but, alas, was not yet in Lifton’s orbit in 1967, though it was my 
pleasure and honor to get to know Erik Erikson somewhat later.) It is a scene worth pondering. 
Erikson in front of the fireplace, sitting on the couch facing the ocean in Lifton’s living room, as 
he read his letter to Gandhi to a small group of leading psychological and politically committed 
intellectuals that included Dan Ellsberg, Norman Birnbaum, Kenneth Keniston, and others at a 
moment of intense ferment over the war in Vietnam. The peace movement then risked veering off 
into violence. Erikson wanted to reassert the significance of satyagraha for Americans, but he felt 
deeply troubled by a psychological violence that lay at the heart of Gandhi’s truth. 
At one point well into his autobiography (My Experiments, 234), Gandhi, always given to 
critical self-assessment, muses about the historical veracity of his story. Has he omitted important 
parts of the narrative? Would his account stand up in a court of law? Surely, he argues, some 
“busybody” could “flatter himself” by showing up the “hollowness of many of my pretensions.” 
Erikson embraces that role of the busybody, because, he says (230–231), “I seemed to sense the 
presence of a kind of untruth in the very protestation of truth; of something unclean when all the 
words spelled out an unreal purity; and above all, of displaced violence where nonviolence was 
the professed issue.” 
Gandhi tells the story of family life in Durban, South Africa, at a time he was beginning to 
assemble a motley bunch of stray individuals whom he would soon forge into followers able to 
lead the coming nonviolent campaigns for social and political justice (My Experiments, 134–137; 
231). It seems it never occurred to Gandhi to ask his wife what she felt about turning their house 
into a political commune. He insisted she accept the changed circumstances of their lives—and 
most of all to take it all on cheerfully. For the most part, she accepted things without question and 
with a genuine sense of joy. But Gandhi also insisted that he and she cheerfully empty the chamber 
pots, since there was no inside plumbing in their house at the time. When one such pot contained 
the waste of a man who was a Christian by religion and an Untouchable by caste, she grimaced. 
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He became furious and she exclaimed, “Keep your house to yourself and let me go.” At that 
outburst, he showed her to the gate, at which point she broke down in despair and righteous anger. 
They made up and Gandhi acknowledges her “matchless powers of endurance,” though he 
stops short of fully owning the difficulty for Kasturba of obeying his authoritarian demands to 
break radically with custom—and do it with a smile on your face. It was the same with his early 
attempts to educate his wife. He was, as he describes himself (My Experiments, 231), a “cruelly 
kind husband” who “harassed her out of my blind love for her.” There is something missing in this 
notion of cruel kindness and blind love that involves harassment. Psychologically, Gandhi seems 
unable to grant that ambivalence lurks in our hearts, even, and maybe most especially, in the deeply 
committed among us who work for peace. The future of satyagraha is at stake, Erikson argues. A 
demanding moralism won’t work. Here Erikson calls forth the wisdom of Freud and 
psychoanalysis (234–235). We cannot pretend to deny “our inner ambiguities, ambivalences, and 
instinctual conflicts, and only an additional leverage of truth based on self-knowledge promises to 
give us freedom in the full light of conscious day.” The alternative is a kind of “moralistic 
terrorism” that drives our worst inclinations and feelings underground, “to remain there until 
riotous conditions of uncertainty or chaos” encourage their emergence with redoubled and often 
deadly energy. “Excess and riot follow repression and suppression,” Erikson says at another point 
(251), “precisely because of the autocratic and blind nature” of moralistic restraint. Ethics must 
replace moralism, an ethics that is “marked by an insightful assent to human values, whereas 
moralism is blind obedience.” Ethics is transmitted with “informed persuasion” rather than 
“absolute interdicts.” 
Moralism restrains behavior in an authoritarian way; ethical renunciation is freely chosen and 
self-imposed. Moralism establishes rigid rules that must be obeyed; ethics seeks to question the 
personal and spiritual meaning of obedience. Moralism blindly punishes offenders; ethics defines 
transgression in humane ways that are appropriate to the offense. Moralism is totalistic; ethics 
remains always relative to the context. Moralism invites abuse from enforcers and too easily 
victimizes offenders to their rigid codes; ethics diffuses limits and always respects the human. 
Moralism is self-righteous; ethics honors humility and difference. Moralism imposes a universalist 
set of demands; ethics embraces nuance, complexity, and contradiction. 
Erikson is particularly troubled by Gandhi’s failure ever to recognize that a sexual relationship 
can be characterized by mutuality. “This is by no means a capacity easily developed or sustained 
without self-control and sacrifice,” Erikson notes (234), “but as an approximation and a goal, it 
describes the only kind of sexual relationship in which the other person does not become a mere 
object either of sexual or aggressive desire.” It is perfectly reasonable, it seems to me, given 
Gandhi’s particular experiences and sexual traumas, as well as his religious background, that he 
would find in brahmacharya a resolution of his inner conflicts. Out of that new self, sealed with a 
vow, he found the strength to forge a new politics of nonviolence that may represent our only hope 
of survival. But along the way, he had to weaponize phallic desire. Kasturba managed to resist him 
where she felt she needed to defend the ground of her being. That action has led some intellectuals 
who like to malign satyagraha to claim her as the real saint, though Erikson sniffs with distain 
(232), What do intellectuals know about sainthood? For most of us struggling to find a usable form 
of nonviolent peacemaking, the point is a tyrannical opposition to desire and ambivalence will 
restrict the usefulness of satyagraha. 
Erikson takes particular note (243) of Gandhi’s fondness for the story of Prahlad, the boy 
prince who would not accept the claim of his father, the Demon King, to have powers greater than 
God. The boy is tortured terribly for not acknowledging his father’s claims. The father’s final 
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challenge to the boy is to embrace a red-hot metal pillar, but as Prahlad embraces that suggestive 
phallic object, out steps God as a half lion and half man who tears the king to pieces. Gandhi called 
the boy the first satyagrahi. Perhaps. But what is the message to his own sons whom he repeatedly 
threatened to disavow and disown when their truth meant rebellion against him? Who is the Demon 
King? 
I would not want to conclude by giving the impression that Erikson, or I, busybodies that we 
are, question the significance of satyagraha because its founder was flawed. Aren’t we all? That is 
not the question. Satyagraha, as I mentioned, is a spiritual practice. We take on its challenges as 
Jesus did going into the desert or facing his death with a reluctant calm. Participation in a 
nonviolent campaign requires self-purification and the willingness to accept unflinchingly the 
violence of those whose evil practices you are trying to change. It can be a risky business, this 
nonviolence. The two most important satyagrahis in the twentieth century, Gandhi and Martin 
Luther King Jr., were assassinated. There is no question it takes massive self-preparation to take 
on the dangerous work of confronting entrenched evil in the world. 
At the same time, self-purification itself can become dangerously cultic. Self-laceration, 
prolonged fasting, and radical experiments with food and sex risk pushing boundaries beyond 
reasonable ethical limits. Communal engagement with offbeat forms of sex, which seems a 
frequent cultic characteristic, becomes in many cases wildly exploitative and victimizes women 
and children. Amy Siskind (a former PhD student of mine) has described in great detail the Fourth 
Wall commune that flourished on the upper westside of Manhattan in the 1960s and 1970s.8 A 
curious blend of psychoanalysis and Marx, the cult mocked traditional psychoanalytic institutes. 
It insisted on absolute free love and sex with different partners, including adolescent children, on 
a regular, if not daily, basis. If a woman and her partner wanted to have a child, getting pregnant 
required consultation with and permission from one’s psychoanalyst, and all children were raised 
communally. All rules of conduct were handed down by the elite training and supervising analysts. 
Liberation became tyrannical. Many lives were destroyed, especially because the AIDS crisis in 
the early 1980s suddenly decimated the cult at the same time the leader developed dementia. 
Another dramatic example is the huge cult in Japan, Aum Shinrikyo, that Robert Jay Lifton 
has authoritatively described.9 Aum Shinrikyo lasted between the mid-1980s and March 22, 1995, 
when it released sarin gas on the Tokyo subway. Led by a partially sighted guru, Shoko Asahara, 
Aum developed an eclectic mix of religious ideas from Buddhism, Hinduism, and the Christian 
Book of Revelation. Asahara gathered some ten thousand followers in Japan and another twenty 
thousand in Russia, as it amassed a war chest of half a billion dollars. The elite of the cult became 
fanatically committed to Asahara’s apocalyptic project and murdered nearly seventy outsiders 
(lawyers, prosecutors, and anyone trying to raise concern) before the final Armageddon as the 
police closed in. Ordinary members had no idea of these activities. They were typically searchers 
after truth. They endured tortuous testing of their commitment in blistering hot showers and 
immersion in ice-cold water (some died). They lived in virtual cages that were unclean and filled 
with vermin to test their spiritual growth, while Asahara himself would travel to fancy restaurants 
in the evening and gorge himself while singing karaoke. He explained his increasing corpulence 
as due to his taking on the bad karma of his followers.10 
So self-purification as a necessary dimension of the engagement in satyagraha is a 
complicated business. Some experiment with one’s own truth may be required to call forth the 
commitment necessary to sustain creative political action. But any such personal experiment 
cannot come at the cost of exploiting others, just as no leader can impose his or her own forms of 
renunciation or asceticism, however seemingly tied to religious and spiritual traditions, on needy 
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followers. Any restraint must be ethically embraced by the individual and not tyrannically imposed 
by the leader or the group. Erikson’s subtle analysis of Gandhi’s failings in this regard is a profound 
lesson in satyagraha. 
Nonviolence is also probably not a politics that is appropriate to all contexts of intractable 
conflict, such as the Nazis or the Soviets under the brutal and paranoid leadership of Joseph Stalin. 
But what I feel is the single most important feature of Gandhi’s truth, something not really 
emphasized by Erikson, is that a nonviolent struggle seeks not only to eliminate a demonstrable 
evil—a salt tax for a country surrounded by ocean or forcing Blacks to sit in the back of the bus—
but in the process to make your opponent a better person ethically. The best contexts for such a 
satyagraha struggle, I think, are when basically good people get caught up in carrying out evil for 
all kinds of historical reasons. The British in India and whites in the old South were like that. They 
were good people with a bad theory. I know the South best, since I am from Georgia and my family 
goes back there over two centuries from well before the Revolutionary War and even includes 
running a large slave plantation near Atlanta in the first half of the nineteenth century. I was in 
high school in the South in the 1950s. The barriers that divided Black and white were visible, 
strong, terrifyingly harsh, and brutally humiliating to Blacks. Some seventy years later and after 
the civil rights movement, it is amazing how readily the races mix in the South now, politics in a 
place like Georgia have been transformed, education improved, and so on. One of my sons married 
an African American woman and two of my male grandchildren, who are now young teens, are 
able to visit me on vacation in north Florida near the Georgia border. In that setting, they never 
face any kind of discrimination. In an earlier generation, I could never have taken them to dinner 
with me, they would have had to wait in the car if I went shopping, I could never have stayed in 
the same motel driving with them to vacation, if we rode a bus I would have been in the front and 
they in the back, and on and on and on. Of course, there is a long way to go. But the civil rights 
movement, which remained remarkably nonviolent, eliminated de jure injustices and changed the 
most offensive de facto insults of segregation, also made whites in the South better human beings. 
Satyagraha probably won’t work where you have bad people with a bad theory, but hopeless 
optimist that I am, I would tend to see Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union in the 1930s as historical 
exceptions. 
Gandhi’s remarkable legacy is a new theory of politics for a world caught up with a rising tide 
of global authoritarianism and most of all the ultimate threats to existence we face with nuclear 
weapons and now with global warming. It is true, as the poet Theodore Roethke says, that in a 
dark time the eye begins to see, but we also need a theory of nonviolence to guide us as we struggle 
with peacemaking in situations of seemingly intractable conflict. Gandhi’s own human failings 
identify the specific areas that allow us to reconsider his theories to build a nonviolent practice that 
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